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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
officer, even though he could not justify an arrest for the underlying
crime of prostitution, may still effect an arrest for the crime of resisting
or obstructing an officer.
The rule of reasonable provocation bases the right to resist squarely
upon the common law justification for resisting an unlawful arrest-
provocation. It would eliminate a potential for abuse created by the
Nunes/statutory approach, i.e., if no grounds exist for an arrest, an ar-
resting officer could create the necessary grounds by provoking the ar-
restee into resistance and then lawfully arresting him for such resistance.
Such a practice would create a potentially dangerous conflict and is
clearly unjust. Under a provocation rule, the difficult distinction between
a patently unlawful arrest and one valid on its face could be eliminated.
If and when standards of reasonableness change, so would the availabil-
ity of the defense.
The Missouri courts and legislature should reconsider the abrogation
of the right to resist an unlawful arrest. Retaining such a limited right
based on provocation would entail little social cost since men in the heat
of passion will use force to preserve their liberty regardless of the exis-
tence of the defense.
THOMAS H. HEARNE




McBane v. McBane I
The twenty-three year marriage of Elinor and William McBane was
dissolved on September 25, 1975, in a decree that divided the marital
property and awarded the wife custody of a minor child and an allow-
ance for child support. Elinor McBane earned a gross salary of $700 per
month as a registered nurse supervisor at the time the dissolution action
was brought. The prospects for her continuing to be financially self-re-
liant were not good, however, because a spinal condition and progressive
arthritis already affected her ability to perform general floor nurse
duties.2 Despite this evidence, the decree denied any award of mainte-
1. 553 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
2. Id. at 523. Because two of the wife's lumbar vertebrae had been fused,
continued work posed a danger that another disc would herniate.
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nance to her and she appealed this denial, contending that the court
should have awarded at least nominal maintenance in order to retain
jurisdiction to modify the award later.3  The appeal raised two ques-
tions: whether an award of nominal maintenance is consistent with the
need-based criteria for awarding maintenance under the current
dissolution statute, and whether an initial award of maintenance is a
precondition to jurisdiction for later modifying the decree to award
maintenance. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City District, after
finding that the wife had an existing physical condition that presented a
substantial potentiality of disabling her, modified the original judgment
by inserting a provision for nominal maintenance of one dollar per year
for the purpose of retaining jurisdiction to award maintenance in the
future.4
Maintenance is a statutory invention; in order for a court to award an
allowance for the support of a spouse or to modify such allowance, au-
thority must be found in the statutes.5 The current statutory provisions
for the allowance of maintenance are found in section 452.335, RSMo
(Supp. 1975) and the provisions for modification of maintenance are
found in section 452.370, RSMo (Supp. 1975).6 The McBane court ex-
pressly construed the maintenance statute to permit the allowance of
nominal maintenance and implicitly construed the modification of the
maintenance statute to preclude modification of a judgment to insert a
provision for spousal maintenance unless the original judgment awarded
some maintenance.7 These readings of the current maintenance provi-
sions continue rules of construction that grew up under the differently
worded prior statute.' This note will critically examine these two con-
structions of the current maintenance provisions to determine whether
they are well founded.
Herbert v. Herbert9 was the first Missouri case to hold that if a divorce
decree does not provide for alimony 10 the court is subsequently without
3. Id. at 522.
4. Id. at 524-25.
5. Abright v. Abright, 454 S.W.2d 957, 958 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970); Gordon
v. Ary, 358 S.W.2d 81, 84 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962); Hughes v. Wagner, 303 S.W.2d
181, 184 (St. L. Mo. App. 1957); Smith v. Smith, 350"Mo. 104, 109, 164 S.W.2d
921, 924 (1942); Bishop v. Bishop, 151 S.W.2d 553 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941).
6. The provisions are adopted from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,
9 U.L.A. 455 (1973). Several other states have recently enacted similar statutes.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-10-114, 14-10-122 (1973); DEL. CODE tit. 13, §§
1512, 1519 (Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 504, 510 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1978); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 403.200, 403.250 (Supp. 1976); MONT. REv. CODES
ANN. §§ 48-322, 48-330 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.09.090,
26.09.170 (Supp. 1977).
7. 553 S.W.2d at 524.
8. 1855 Mo. Laws (codified at § 452.070, RSMo 1969, repealed Jan. 1, 1974).
9. 221 Mo. App. 201, 299 S.W. 840 (St. L. Ct. App. 1927), construing § 1806,
RSMo 1919 (which is identical to § 452.070, RSMo 1969). The contrary result in
Scales v. Scales, 65 Mo. App. 292 (St. L. Ct. App. 1896), has been largely ignored
1978] 755
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jurisdiction to modify the decree and insert a provision for alimony. De-
spite the fact that the question turned on a construction of the alimony
statutes then in effect, the opinion did not analyze the specific wording
of the statute. Instead it merely cited cases from three other jurisdictions
as supporting the rule it adopted.1
The most often cited Missouri case on this question is Smith v. Smith.
2
The statutory provision controlling in Smith provided that the court
"may make such alteration, from time to time, as to the allowance of
alimony and maintenance, as may be proper. ... ." The Smith court found
that this statute did not contain any "express provisions ... permitting
the court after a decree of divorce, to make new orders as to alimony"
and held that in order for there to be a subsequent modification, some
liability for alimony must have been fixed at the time the divorce was
granted.1 3 The theory adopted in Smith for denying a later action for
alimony was that no authority was granted by the modification statute
"since there is nothing in the decree to alter or modify."' 4
in subsequent Missouri cases. Baker v. Baker, 274 S.W.2d 322, 324 n.1 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1954).
10. The rule for periodic alimony or maintenance has been different from
that applied to the division of marital property. In general, property settlements
or lump sum awards are not modifiable. A recent case has held that even
periodic alimony, if for a determinate period, is analogous to alimony in gross
and so is not modifiable. Laney v. Laney, 535 S.W.2d 510 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1976). The question of modification of maintenance of a spouse has been held to
be separate from that of child support, which is generally modifiable even where
the initial decree does not provide for child support. Robinson v. Robinson, 268
Mo. 703, 186 S.W. 1032 (1916); Backy v. Backy, 355 S.W.2d 389 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1962); Herbert v. Herbert, 221 Mo. App. 201, 299 S.W. 840 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1927). Agreements between husband and wife in settlement of marital
property are governed by still another hypertechnical rule, that provision for
maintenance in an agreement which is "approved" but not "incorporated" into a
decree is not modifiable, whereas provision for maintenance in an agreement
which is incorporated into the decree is modifiable as alimony. Goulding v.
Goulding, 497 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973); Toth v. Toth, 483
S.W.2d 417, 422 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
11. Howell v. Hoi ell, 104 Cal. 45, 47, 37 P. 770, 771 (1894) (construing a
California statute, now repealed, which provided that the husband may be com-
pelled to provide maintenince for the wife and that "the court may from time to
time modify its orders in these respects"); Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Il. 104, 109, 147
N.E. 659, 661 (1925) (construing an Illinois statute, now repealed, which pro-
vided: "The court may, on application, from time to time, make such alterations
in the allowance of alimony and maintenance ... as shall appear reasonable and
proper"; Spain v. Spain, 177 Iowa 249, 251, 158 N.W. 529, 530 (1916) (constru-
ing an Iowa statute, now repealed, which provided: "When a divorce is decreed,
the court may make such order in relation to the children, property, parties, and
the maintenance of the parties as shall be right. Subsequent changes may be
made by it in these respects when circumstances render them expedient.").
12. 350 Mo. 104, 164 S.W.2d 921 (1942).
13. Id. at 923, construing § 1519, RSMo 1939 (identical to § 1806, RSMo
1919, interpreted in Herbert, and to § 452.070, RSMo 1969).
14. Id. at 924.
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It is questionable whether the statutory language supported such an
interpretation. As noted, the statute in force when Smith was decided
provided that the court could make such alterations as to the allowance
of alimony and maintenance as were proper.'5 A common sense view
would regard the insertion of an alimony provision when there had not
been one in the original decree as an "alteration as to the allowance of
alimony," and thus authorized by the statute. One taking such an ap-
proach would reject as artificial the argument in Smith that inserting a
provision for alimony is not strictly an alteration because there is nothing
in the decree to alter. The use of the words "alteration as to" cannot be
said to presuppose an extant allowance of alimony, because "alteration as
to" has a more inclusive meaning than "alteration in" or "alteration of";
a change "as to" a thing in ordinary usage does encompass a change
from the nonexistence to the existence of the thing.
Smith's overtechnical argument that what does not exist cannot be
modified involves not only a narrow construction of the statutory lan-
guage, but also a narrow view of the policy behind the statute. Smith
does cite the reasons for having a statute that allows modification of
maintenance payments: "Flexibility is necessarily required in order to ac-
commodate the payments to the current needs of the wife and the ability
of the husband to pay as future conditions may affect these factors." 16
The Smith court proceeded as if this reason for modifiability applies ex-
clusively where maintenance payments are originally ordered, ignoring
the fact that the need for adjustments to meet changed needs is equally
pressing when there was no maintenance award in the initial decree.
Nonetheless, later Missouri cases have followed Smith without excep-
tion.1 7
The statutory provision for modification of maintenance interpreted
in Smith has been repealed and replaced by section 452.370, and the new
provisions have altered the statutory framework in which the question of
a procedural bar to subsequent modification must be viewed. The cur-
rent statute provides that "the provisions of any decree respecting
15. Although nearly every jurisdiction follows the rule adopted in Smith, only
the Nebraska and Wisconsin modification statutes explicitly prohibit the later in-
sertion of support provisions. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-365 (1974); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 247.32 (West Supp. 1977). The New York statute expressly permits such inser-
tion. N.Y. [DoM. REL.] LAw art. 13, § 236 (McKinney 1977). See Pap v. Pap, 51
App. Div. 1091, 381 N.Y.S. 542 (1976); Bertsche v. Bertsche, 343 N.Y.S.2d 176(Fam. Ct. 1972); M. v. M., 70 Misc. 2d 974, 335 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Fam. Ct. 1972);
Smith v. Smith, 60 Misc. 2d 692, 303 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Fam. Ct. 1969).
16. 164 S.W.2d at 924.
17. Glick v. Glick, 372 S.W.2d 912 (Mo. 1963); Kerby v. Kerby, 544 S.W.2d
292 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976); Carrell v. Carrell, 503 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1973); Ruckman v. Ruckman, 337 S.W.2d 100 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960);
Baker v. Baker, 274 S.W.2d 322 (Spr. Mo. App. 1954); Finley v. Finley, 172
S.W.2d 473 (Spr. Mo. App. 1943).
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maintenance or support may be modified only as to installments accru-
ing subsequent to the motion for modification and only upon a showing
of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the
terms unreasonable."'" This language lends itself less readily than did
the prior statutory language to the interpretation that it precludes an
action for maintenance subsequent to a decree devoid of any allowance
for maintenance. Applying the Smith rule under the terms of section
452.370 would require the implausible holding that the denial of
maintenance in a dissolution judgment is not a "provision respecting
maintenance." Moreover, the policy of allowing modification of mainte-
nance in changed circumstances is served by allowing insertion of such a
provision where circumstances render continuing refusal of maintenance
unreasonable. The McBane court did not consider whether section
452.370 allows the addition of maintenance provisions which were not
allowed under section 452.070; its award of nominal maintenance was
straightforwardly predicated on the assumption that it does not. It is to
be hoped that future decisions turning on the reservation of jurisdiction
for the modification of dissolution judgments will expand their
analysis. 19
The effect of erecting this procedural bar to subsequent actions for
maintenance is to require a spouse to go through the motions of seeking
support in the action for dissolution of marriage, even though his or her
current needs would not justify a maintenance award, merely to preserve
the ability to request an allowance in the event of changed cir-
cumstances.20  This requirement creates an unnecessary pitfall for an
unwary spouse who fails to seek maintenance in the original decree. This
result is unfortunate, because the policy of the statute is not served by
such myopic interpretation of the statutory language. The rule applied
in Smith and its progeny that jurisdiction to modify maintenance requires
an initial award of maintenance was assumed without discussion still to
be good law in McBane; this tacit assumption was an indispensable pre-
mise in the reasoning that led to the court's award of nominal mainte-
nance.
18. § 452.370, RSMo (Supp. 1975). An exception is provided for property
settlement agreements between the parties which are incorporated into the
judgment for dissolution pursuant to § 452.325(6), RSMo (Supp. 1975).
19. It should be noted, in defense of the court's failure to examine whether
the change in statute should effect a change in the rule, that the point was prob-
ably not argued by the litigants because a new interpretation was in neither
party's interest. For the wife to argue that § 452.370 permits a maintenance
award where there was none in the dissolution judgment would be to abandon
her appeal requesting nominal maintenance inasmuch as it would not be needed
for retention of jurisdiction; for the husband to argue that § 452.370 ought not
to be construed as § 452.070 had been would be to concede that the award or
nonaward of nominal maintenance would have no practical impact.
20. McKensey v. McKensey, 65 N.J. Eq. 633, 55 A. 1073 (1903).
758 [Vol. 43
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Given this interpretation of the modification provisions, the question
arises whether a court is able to award nominal maintenance under cur-
rent statutes. The prior statutory provision for maintenance, section
452.070, did not specify the criteria courts should apply in determining
whether to enter an award of maintenance. The section merely provided
that an order for maintenance should issue "as, from the circumstances
of the parties and the nature of the case, shall be reasonable ... .,, 21 The
current statute is far more explicit. It provides that a maintenance order
may be granted to either spouse in a dissolution proceeding "but only if
[the court] finds that the spouse seeking maintenance (1) [1]acks suffi-
cient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to pro-
vide for his reasonable needs; and (2) [i]s unable to support himself
through appropriate employment . .. " 22 Both of these conditions,
known as the "subsection (1) criteria," must be satisfied before a court is
empowered by the statute to issue a maintenance order, and both entail
a factual finding of financial need. 23
Applying these criteria, the McBane court enumerated the items of
property allotted to the wife, which were valued at roughly $20,000,
none of which were income-producing. The court observed that the
property was clearly insufficient to satisfy her reasonable needs "looking
forward to the indefinite future."2 4 The question was thus narrowed to
whether Elinor McBane was unable to support herself through appro-
priate employment, despite the fact that she was apparently able to sup-
port herself on her salary as a registered nurse. The court found that
the wife's existing physical condition presented a substantial possibility of
disabling her from continued employment. Subsection (2) of section
452.335 provides that once it has been determined pursuant to the sub-
section (1) criteria that maintenance should be awarded, the amount and
duration of maintenance should be determined in the light of all rele-
vant factors, including "the age, and the physical and emotional condi-
tion of the spouse seeking maintenance." 25 Hence, the McBane court
appeared to be using the criteria provided in subsection (2) of 452.335
to justify the initial award of maintenance permitted by subsection (1). In
re Marriage of Sharp,26 a Colorado decision interpreting a similar statute,
held that the subsection (1) provisions, which are prerequisites to
awarding maintenance and require a definition of reasonable needs and
appropriate employment, must be read in connection with the list of
21. 1855 Mo. Laws (codified at § 452.070, RSMo 1969, repealed Jan. 1, 1974).
22. § 452.335(1), RSMo (Supp. 1975).
23. "The whole of maintenance appears to be what was formerly merely a
part of it: need of the party seeking maintenance and the ability of the other to
pay." Krauskopf, Maintenance: Theory and Negotiation, 33 J. Mo. B. 24, 24 (1977).
24. 553 S.W.2d at 523.
25. §, 452.335(2)(5), RSMo (Supp. 1975).
26. 539 P.2d 1306 (Colo. App. 1975).
1978]
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factors in subsection (2), although on the face of the statute the latter are
to be considered only in setting the amount and duration of mainte-
nance. Similarly, in Brueggmann v. Brueggemann2 7 the Missouri Court of
Appeals, St. Louis Distric, considered a petitioner's age in determining
what appropriate employment for that individual might be. Con-
sequently, the McBane court's consideration of the wife's health in mak-
ing the initial determination whether maintenance should be awarded is
not without support in the case law. The McBane court moved directly
from a description of Elinor McBane's physical condition and the find-
ing that her condition rendered her employment status unstable to an
order awarding nominal maintenance, without articulating its major
premise, viz., that she was unable to support herself through appropriate
employment because of the existence of a job-threatening physical dis-
ability. The requirement that the person seeking maintenance be unable
to support himself through appropriate employment can be broken up
into two factors: inability to support oneself and inappropriate employ-
ment. The failure to specify exactly which of these criteria justified the
award leaves the McBane opinion open to criticism.
The court did discuss several recent cases involving similar fact situa-
tions to support its award of nominal maintenance. Only one of those
cases, Davis v. Davis,2 8 was decided under maintenance provisions com-
parable to those in effect in Missouri, 29 and the opinion in that case
appears to suffer from this same defect of failing to explain its central
premise. In Davis the trial court granted an award of nominal mainte-
nance of one dollar per year and the husband appealed that award. The
appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that the need-based
criteria for awarding maintenance are satisfied in a situation where the
respondent introduced evidence of an ankle injury sufficient to support
the trial court's finding that her present and future employment status
was unstable.3 0 The statutory basis of this holding was not specified.
The court might have meant that instability in current employment is to
be considered inappropriate employment; alternatively, the court might
have meant that unstable employment amounts to an inability to be self-
supporting. If the former were meant, it is not clear what standards of
stability or of appropriateness were assumed; the latter seems to stretch
27. 551 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
28. 35 Colo. App. 447, 534 P.2d 809 (1975), construing CoLo. REv. STAT. §§
14-10-114, 14-10-122 (1973).
29. Three other cases cited in McBane are distinguishable. Evans v. Evans,
337 So. 2d 998 (Fla. App. 1976) was decided under a very different statute. The
current Florida maintenance provisions are FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.08, 61.14(West Supp. 1977). Pettibone v. Pettibone, 22 Ariz. App. 570, 529 P.2d 724(1974), was decided before the effective date of the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act provisions adopted in Arizona. Carrell v. Carrell, 503 S.W.2d 48 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1973) was also rendered before the effective date of the new stat-
utes and did not grant nominal maintenance.
30. 534 P.2d at 812.
760 [Vol. 43
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the meaning of "unable to support himself." 31 In following the Davis
precedent, the McBane decision similarly did not explain which of the
statute's need-based criteria were met in Elinor McBane's financial cir-
cumstances.
Another logical lacuna in the McBane court's move from describing
Elinor McBane's physical condition as rendering her employment unsta-
ble to awarding nominal maintenance appears in its practice of looking
forward to the "indefinite future" 32 to determine the ability of the
spouse seeking maintenance to support himself. It is well settled that
there is no statutory basis for a court indulging in speculation or con-
jecture as to future needs of a dependent spouse in awarding mainte-
nance. Several recent Missouri cases have found it error and abuse of
discretion for a trial court to award maintenance for a fixed term only 
33
or to award maintenance which is "stair-stepped" in decreasing and ter-
minable amounts 34 if there is no evidence before it that the dependent
spouse's prospects for financial independence were likely to improve. If
a court should not provide for future termination of support without
evidence that circumstances will change, neither should a court ground
the initial award of support on conjecture as to future conditions. It is
probably for this reason that McBane and Davis are careful to limit their
grants of nominal maintenance to situations where the instability of the
dependent spouse's employment is related to "a physical condition exist-
ing at the time of the marriage dissolution" 35 or to an "existing injury." 36
This approach fails to separate the question whether a physical disability
exists from that of Whether the spouse is presently inappropriately
employed or presently unable to support himself, and it is the latter
which the maintenance statute requires. By not pegging the award of
nominal maintenance to statutory criteria of inappropriateness of
employment or of inability to support oneself, the court leaves its award
unjustified.
It was not really a consideration of present financial needs that moved
the courts in McBane and Davis to grant maintenance, as is manifest
from the amounts granted (one dollar per year). Rather, the awards
were made in contemplation of a rule of interpretation held over from
earlier modification statutes. All that the recipients of nominal mainte-
nance awards had shown themselves to be in reasonable need of was the
court's continuing jurisdiction. Unless the potential loss of the court's
31. § 452.335(1), RSMo (Supp. 1975).
32. 553 S.W.2d at 523.
33. In re Marriage of Valleroy, 548 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); In
re Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
34. In re Marriage of Cornell, 550 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977);
LoPiccolo v. LoPiccolo, 547 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
35. 553 S.W.2d at 524 (emphasis added).
36. 534 P.2d at 813 (emphasis added).
1978]
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jurisdiction is included in section 452.335(1) as a factor relevant to de-
termining reasonable need and appropriateness of employment, the
statutes do not seem to authorize an award of maintenance in cases like
McBane.
3 7
It cannot be denied that granting one dollar annual maintenance
under a need-based statute is paradoxical at best. McBane offers no ex-
planation as to why courts should be forced to award a nominal amount
of maintenance when the evidence convinces the court that the recipient
has no present need of support payments. This result could be avoided
if the courts would not strain to interpret provisions for modification of
maintenance to preclude the modification of a dissolution judgment that
does not contain an award of maintenance or an express reservation of
jurisdiction. 38 Until and unless the courts change their approach,
McBane stands for the proposition that financially independent parties
who anticipate the future impairment of earning capacity will be re-
quired to produce evidence of likely future financial needs to preserve
their right to request maintenance when their needs become actual.
DONALD G. Scorr
37. That § 452.335 and Colorado's § 14-10-114 do not list retaining jurisdic-
tion as a factor should provide an argument that those sections do not require an
award of maintenance as a precondition to the court having jurisdiction over the
question in changed circumstances. However, the force of that argument is
weakened by the fact that the listed factors are not exclusive of other considera-
tions. Brueggemann v. Brueggemann, 551 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1977).
38. In Carrell v. Carrell, 503 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977), the court
reduced a previous award of maintenance to nothing in the light of changed
circumstances and inserted a provision that the court reserved jurisdiction to
reinstate the alimony as circumstances require. Where such a provision may be
inserted in the initial decree, the objections to awarding nominal maintenance
under the current statute could be sidestepped, but requiring such a provision in
the decree as a precondition of jurisdiction to alter maintenance merely substi-
tutes a different trap for an unwary spouse whose ability to support himself is
unstable. The legislative policy favoring modification ought to be given effect to
eliminate the pitfalls that preclude reassessing the need for maintenance in
changed circumstances.
9
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